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Game theory and politics / Steven J. Brams.

New York : Free Press, [1975] .
ISBN 0029045509, 9780029045503

Location Call Number Status Consortium Loan
George Washington
Gelman stacks
JA 73 .B73 Available Request
LIB stacks
JA73 .B73 DUE 12-03-2017
Mullen Library stacks
JA73.B81 G2 Available Request
George Mason
Arlington Campus stacks
JA73.B7 G3 Available Request
Fenwick stacks
Lauinger stacks
JA73 .B73 Available Request
Georgetown Law
GT Law Borrowing: GT patrons use Law catalog; Others use ILL
JA73 .B73 1975
Subjects Coalition (Social sciences)
Game theory.
Jeux, Théorie des.
Political science -- Mathematical models.
Politieke wetenschappen.
Politique -- Modèles mathématiques.
Description xix, 312 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
Copyright Date [1975]
Notes Includes bibliographical references (pages 291-293) and index.
Contents Coalition Games : Power an coalitions -- Restructions on coalition alignments -- The Stability of alignments -- Empiricla conclusions of the Luce-Rogow model -- The Concept of winning -- The Size principle -- The Information effect -- Criticisms of the size principle -- As Alternative goal : maximizing one's share of the spoils.
Election Games : The Need for models to assess the consequences of electoral reform -- Presidential campaigns and voting behavior -- The Goals of the candidates -- The Popular-vote model -- The Electoral vote model -- The 3/2's allocation rule -- Why the large states are favored -- Testing the models -- Campaign allocations and biases through 1980 -- Limitatios and extensions of the models.
International relations game : Two-person zero-sum games with saddlepoints -- Two-person zero-sum games without saddlepoints -- Pure and mixed strategies -- Interpretation of mixed strategies -- Two-person nonzero-sum games -- Prisoner's dilemma and the theor of metagames -- Chicken and the Cuban missle crisis.
Qualitative voting games : Voting procedures -- Sincere voting -- Straightforward strategies and voting procedures -- Equilibrium choices and vulnerability -- Desirable strategies and equilibria -- The Relationship between desirable and admissible strategies -- Sophisticated voting -- Coalitions and information -- Voting on voting procedures -- The Paradox of voting.
Quantitative Voting Games : Reguirements for a voting system of proportional representation -- Rules that meet the requirements -- Interdependence of the requirements -- The Effects of size -- Information and the choice of strategies.
Vote-trading Games : What the general possibility theorem precludes -- Judgments about vote trading -- Definitions and assumptions -- Sincere and insincere voting -- Initial trades and the paracos of vote trading -- The Consequences of refusing to trade -- The Consequences of forming coalitions -- Conditions limiting vote trading -- Empirical examples of the paradox of vote trading.
Voting Power : The Shapley-Shibik index of voting power -- The Banzhof index of voting power -- Coalition models of the two power indices -- Calculation of the power indices -- Three paradoxes of voting power.
Network Numbers (OCoLC)1120947
WorldCat Search OCLC WorldCat
WorldCat Identities Brams, Steven J.
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