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The nature of necessity.


Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1974.
ISBN 0198244045

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Subjects Bien.
Essence (Philosophie)
Essentialism (Philosophy)
Good and evil.
Logik.
Mal.
Modaliteit.
Modalité (Logique)
Modality (Logic)
Mogelijkheid.
Necessity (Philosophy)
Nécessité (Philosophie)
Noodzakelijkheid.
Notwendigkeit.
Philosophie.
Description ix, 255 pages 23 cm.
Copyright Date 1974.
Notes Includes bibliographical references.
Contents [pt]. 1. Preliminary distinctions and remarks -- 1. Necessity circumscribed -- 2. Modality de dicto and modality de re -- [pt]. 2. Modality de re : objections -- 1. The problem -- 2. Essentialism and set theoretical reduction -- 3. Essentialism and the number of apostles -- 4. Essentialism and the mathematical cyclist -- [pt]. 3. Modality de re : explanations -- 1. The locus of necessity -- 2. The Kernel function -- 3. Some objections -- A. The Kernel function and Kripke semantics -- B. Identity and the Kernel function -- C. Circularity and the Kernel function -- [pt]. 4. Worlds, books, and essential properties -- 1. Worlds -- 2. Books -- 3. Existence and properties in a world -- 4. Actuality -- 5. This world and the actual world -- 6. Relative possibility -- 7. Truth and truth-in-[is proportional to] -- 8. Necessary truth and essential properties -- 9. Some putative principles -- 10. What properties are essential to Socrates? -- 11. World-indexed properties -- 12. Could Socrates have been an alligator? -- [pt]. 5. The necessity of natures -- 1. Essence preliminarily characterized -- 2. The nature of essence -- 3. Essences and proper names -- 4. Hesperus and Phosphorus.
[pt]. 6. Transworld identity or worldbound individuals? -- 1. The question -- 2. Socrates in [is proportional to] and Socrates in W -- 3. The problem of transworld identity -- A. The problem stated -- B. A temporal analogy -- C. The problem resolved -- D. Essence and transworld identity -- E. Does ramification destroy information? -- 4. Objections to TWI-- 5. Counterpart theory -- 6. Semantic inadequacies of counterpart theories -- A. Socrates and Xenophon -- B. Socrates and Socrates-identity -- 7. Metaphysical inadequacies of counterpart theory -- [pt]. 7. Possible but unactual objects : the classical argument -- 1. The question -- 2. Modal logic and possible objects -- 3. How shall we take the semantics? -- 4. Pure and applied semantics -- 5. Applied semantics and possible objects -- 6. Are there nonexistent objects? -- 7. The classical argument -- 8. Proper names and negative existentials : Russell -- 9. Proper names and negative existentials : Searle -- 10. Proper names and negative existentials : the historical chain view -- 11. Some varieties of singular existentials.
[pt]. 8. Possible but unactual objects : on what there isn't -- 1. Predicative and impredicative singular propositions -- 2. The classical argument fails -- 3. Creatures of fiction-- 4. Names : their function in fiction -- [pt]. 9. God, evil, and the metaphysics of freedom -- 1. The problem -- 2. The free will defense -- 3. The objection -- 4. Which worlds could God have created? -- 5. Counterfactuals -- 6. Leibniz's lapse -- 7. Transworld depravity -- 8. The free will defense triumphant -- 9. God's existence and natural evil -- 10. God's existence and natural evil -- 11. The probabilistic argument from evil -- [pt]. 10. God and necessity -- 1. The Anselmian statement -- 2. The argument restated -- 3. The argument examined -- 4. A mistaken modal version -- 5. The argument without possible objects -- 6. The Hartshorne-Malcolm version -- 7. A victorious modal version -- 8. Final objections and reflections -- Appendix : Quine's objection to quantified modal logic -- 1. The objection initially stated -- 2. Sizeability is not a property -- 3. The objection restated -- 4. The objection examined -- A. The Hintikka response -- B. The Smullyan reply -- 5. Proper terms and Aristotelian essentialism -- 6. Modal logic and essentialism -- 7. Quine's charge and Professor Marcus -- 8. Quine's charge and Professor Parsons -- 9. Essentialism and applied semantics -- Index.
Network Numbers (OCoLC)1030064
(OCoLC)ocm01030064
WorldCat Search OCLC WorldCat
WorldCat Identities Plantinga, Alvin.
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